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THE BUZZARD WAS THEIR FRIEND-HEDGE
FUNDS AND THE PROBLEM OF OVERVALUED
EQUITY
Richard A. Booth*
An economist walks into a bar on Election Day.
Bartender: So how did you vote?
Economist: I didn't vote. This isn't Florida. So I figured my vote
wouldn't matter.
Bartender: That's un-American Bub. What if everyone acted that
way?
Economist: Then I'd vote.'
INTRODUCTION
There are two different worries about hedge funds. One is that hedge
* Martin G. McGuinn Professor of Business Law, Villanova University School of
Law. The title is an allusion to a Dan Hicks song. DAN HICKS & His HOT LICKS, The
Buzzard was Their Friend, on WHERE'S THE MONEY? (Blue Thumb Records 1971).
1. My thanks to Marvin Chirelstein for this tidbit.
2. There is no precise definition of what constitutes a hedge fund. One of the first
hedge funds was an investment partnership formed by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1949 that
sought to eliminate market risk by investing roughly half in stocks bought long and half in
stocks sold short. The idea was to make money no matter which way the market went.
Hence the name-"hedge" fund. Today, the term is used to describe pretty much any
unregulated investment pool other than venture capital ("VC") funds and leveraged buyout
("LBO") funds. The term "private equity" is generally reserved for funds held by one or
two or a few investors or a family of people. In contrast, the term "hedge fund" is usually
reserved for investment funds that are formed to seek unrelated investors and that seek to
avoid regulation under federal or state securities laws. While some hedge funds continue to
pursue the long-short strategy of the original hedge fund, many funds pursue other strategies
as well. See SEC STAFF REPORT, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 3-4
(2003) [hereinafter SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT] (describing the history of hedge funds).
Thus, the word "hedge" has lost much of its original meaning in the context of the phrase
"hedge fund." Regarding the distinction (if any) between hedge funds and private equity,
see Jonathan Bevilacqua, Convergence and Divergence: Blurring the Lines Between Hedge
Funds and Private Equity Funds, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 251 (2006). For a comprehensive guide
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funds are unsuitable for many (if not most) investors, who thus need
protection from their predations.3 The other worry is that hedge funds may
be (or may become) too powerful.4 If so, they may undermine the financial
to how hedge funds avoid regulation, see Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A
Design Primer,7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 323 (2007).
3. See Helen Parry, Hedge Funds, Hot Markets and the High Net Worth Investor: A
Case for Greater Protection?, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 703 (2001) (arguing for greater
protection of even high net worth investors of hedge funds); Thomas C. Pearson & Julia L.
Pearson, Protecting Global Financial Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC
Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2007) (detailing the
insufficiency of current hedge fund regulations and proposing a coordinated international
approach); J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation,
Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799 (2007) (advocating the
incorporation of self-regulation and regulatory competition in future attempts to regulate the
hedge fund industry); see also Joel Seligman, Should Investment Companies Be Subject to a
New Statutory Self-Regulatory Organization?, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 1115 (2005) (proposing
a similar regulatory scheme but exempting hedge funds); Tamar Frankel, The Scope and
Jurisprudence of the Investment Management Regulation, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 939 (2005)
(recounting SEC regulatory initiatives in connection with investment companies). But see
Paul S. Atkins, Protecting Investors Through Hedge Fund Advisor Registration: Long on
Costs, Short on Returns, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 537 (2006) (both generally
questioning such arguments for hedge fund regulation); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to
Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REV. 975.
4. See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock
Market Volatility--What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is
Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909 (2005) (concluding that it is unlikely that the
SEC will take any steps to reform institutional investor behavior). Aside from macro risks
to the financial system, there are numerous other worries about specific activities of hedge
funds relating to control and governance of public corporations and the integrity of the
bankruptcy system. See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95
GEO. L.J. 1375 (2007) (finding that hedge fumd takeovers are not having the negative effects
that critics believe exist); Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge
Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2007) (analyzing the effects of
hedge fund takeovers on the governance of corporations); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S.
Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156
U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) (examining the significance of decoupling strategies and
proposing additional regulatory responses to empty voting); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S.
Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership:
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007) (assessing
the potential costs and benefits associated with empty voting and hidden (morphable)
ownership); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (examining empty votes
and vote buying and suggesting disclosure requirements); Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv.
1021 (2007) (observing the increased power of hedge funds in corporate governance); Dale
A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREP. Bus. L.J. 1 (2006) (analyzing the merits of
government regulation of hedge funds); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate
Governance, and Firm Performance (ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 139/2006, Vand.
U. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 07-28, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-948907
(describing how hedge funds are taking part in a new form of activism and monitoring that
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system just as Long Term Capital Management ("LTCM") almost did.5
Both worries are overblown.
First, hedge funds do not want the money of small investors. Hedge
funds rely on the private offering exemption under the federal securities
laws. Thus, practically speaking, a hedge fund may offer investment units
only to accredited investors.6 To be sure, the definition of accredited
investor includes relatively small investors.7 It may be a good idea to beef
it up a bit. But a hedge fund must also be careful to limit the total number
of investors to 100 or fewer. Otherwise, it must register as an investment
company, 8 and that would effectively preclude most hedge funds from
doing what they do. The bottom line is that a hedge fund cannot raise
enough money from 100 smallish investors. Besides, there has been no
such problem with other funds that rely on this model such as venture
capital ("VC") funds or leveraged buyout ("LBO") funds. Why should we
expect any such problem with hedge funds?9
The second worry is a bit more difficult to dispel. The simple answer
was not seen among the institutional investors of the past); Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Hedge Fund Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights (U. Pa. Inst. for Law
& Econ. Res. Paper No. 08-02, N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 08-09, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093387 (discussing the concerns and effects of hedge fund
activism on the holders of bonds in companies that have been taken over by hedge funds);
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Anti-Bankruptcy: Hedge Fund Activity in
Corporate Reorganizations (Dec. 2007) (draft of paper on file with author) (discussing the
hedge fund strategy of buying out bank loans to businesses in the hope that, in the event of a
default, it can use the reorganization process to gain equity in the business).
5. See Karmel, supra note 4; Paredes, supra note 3; Pearson & Pearson, supra note 3;
see also Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 681
(2000) (detailing the collapse of Long Term Capital Management).
6. See Securities Act of 1933 §4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)
(stating that the prohibitions relating to interstate commerce outlined in section 5 of the
Securities Act does not apply to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering."); SEC Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008) (outlining the requirements to
qualify for the "Exemption for limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount of
offering."). See generally SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
7. The definition of accredited investor is found in SEC Rule 501, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501
(2008). It includes individuals with a net worth of $1,000,000 or more or annual income of
$200,000 or more ($300,000 with spouse).
8. Investment Company Act ("ICA") §3(c)(1) (specifying that "[a]ny issuer whose
outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than
one hundred persons and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a
public offering of its securities" is not an investment company, "within the meaning of this
subchapter."). ICA §3(c)(7) also permits sales to an unlimited number of qualified
purchasers. ICA §2(a)(51) defines a qualified purchaser and includes individuals with
$5,000,000 or more in investments.
9. One of the big questions about the future of securities regulation is whether it
should focus primarily on the retail side (to protect small investors) or the wholesale side (to
make the market as efficient as possible). The question what to do about hedge funds is one
of several issues implicated.
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is that LTCM is unlikely to happen again. Fool me once, shame on you.
Fool me twice, shame on me. Counterparties now know to check up on
their trading partners. On the other hand, there will be financial crises and
scandals, and there may be many of them. As one commentator recently
noted, there have been at least four 100-year events in the last twenty years:
the crash of 1987; LTCM; the dotcom bust; the scandals of Enron,
WorldCom, et alia, and now the subprime meltdown. Although there are
some common threads running through these events, each uncovered a
discrete problem with the financial system that has been relatively easy to
address. In each case, a financial innovation of some sort was overused. In
each case, we learned the limits of the financial strategy, and in each case,
the markets were better off for both. No doubt there are more scandals to
come. Two steps forward, one step back. Batting .666 is not so bad.
Accordingly, I focus here on the upside of hedge funds. Although
most commentators seem to be worried about them, a few legal scholars
have suggested that hedge funds might be an important positive force in
corporate governance. They argue that hedge funds might finally do what
some thought institutional investors would do.'0 My somewhat different
thesis is that we need hedge funds to keep the market efficient.
II. THE EFFICIENCY PARADOX
The efficiency paradox has come home to roost. One of the puzzling
implications of the efficient market theory is that if everyone believes it,
the market will no longer be efficient. In other words, if everyone believes
that it is impossible to beat the market, no one will try. Investors will stop
doing research, and the market will become inefficient. Then it will pay to
do research and to try to beat the market. Does this mean that the market
will gyrate between periods of inefficiency and hyperefficiency? Not at all.
What it means is that the market will equilibrate somewhere in the middle.
Investors will do just enough research in the aggregate. When the next
dollar spent on research seems unlikely to generate more than another
dollar of gain-alpha gain or gain in excess of the market rate of return-
the investor will stop doing research. In short, the efficiency paradox is a
10. See, e.g., Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A
Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225 (2007)
(arguing that the compensation structure in hedge funds should be followed for institutional
investors thus increasing the incentive for institutional investors to become activists). I do
not necessarily agree that institutional investors have failed to affect corporate governance.
Arguably, they induced the shift to equity compensation. Although that raises a whole new
set of issues, it cannot be denied that managers became focused on stockholder wealth. See
Richard A. Booth, Five Decades of Corporation Law-From Conglomeration to Equity
Compensation (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper 110,
2008) (relating the history of corporate law and takeovers).
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self-correcting free-rider problem. Most investors free ride on the research
of others. That is, most investors are uninformed traders who assume that
because others do their homework, market prices are trustworthy. Other
investors are informed traders who figure that they can make additional
returns because others do not try.'
The question is whether there is any danger that regulation of hedge
funds will reduce the level of informed trading. Although the volume of
trading in stocks has risen sharply since the 1960s, there are relatively few
serious investors at work in the U.S. today who seek to beat the market.
Indeed, hedge funds may account for most of the stock picking in the U.S.
market today. So we must be careful not to regulate away the ability of
hedge funds to do what they do.
This is particularly important in the aftermath of Enron, WorldCom,
and other recent corporate scandals. Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy
have argued that this spate of scandals was caused in large part by
overvalued equity. Essentially, their argument is that managers were
induced to undertake increasingly risky behaviors in an effort to protect the
value of their stock options and other forms of equity compensation. 3 I
disagree.
First, overvalued equity would still be a problem even if equity were
not the primary form of compensation. No CEO wants to preside over the
devaluation of her company, and, whatever the system of compensation, it
is unlikely that the CEO will be rewarded for doing so.'4
Second, options are the best device we have to induce managers to
11. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 569-79 (1984) (discussing informed and uninformed traders
and examining methods of information dissemination from the informed to the uninformed).
12. There may be a fair number of amateur investors who try to beat the market, but it
is likely that their trading activity contributes mostly noise to the market. In other words,
they produce more heat than light. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, The Courage of
Misguided Convictions: The Trading Behavior of Individual Investors (July 1999),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-219175 (suggesting psychological explanations for
errors commonly made by investors and arguing that overconfidence prompts individuals to
trade excessively). On the other hand, crowds can be quite perceptive even if their members
are not. See generally, JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2004) (arguing that
groups of people generally produce smarter decisions than individuals).
13. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How
We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, 44-49 (ECGI Working
Paper No. 44/2004, 2004). Some less thoughtful observers have suggested that executive
compensation caused CEOs to undertake risky business strategies in an effort to increase
stock price still further.
14. See Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(portraying that executive compensation plan based on reported earnings may have led
management to spin off loss stock rather than sell it thus losing tax benefit for corporate
stockholder). To argue that we should pay officers some other way is to argue that we
should require stockholders to care about something other than stock price.
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maximize stockholder wealth."5 Moreover, options have numerous side
benefits. They reward good management whether it entails growing the
company or shrinking the company, and they induce companies to
distribute cash generously through stock repurchases.16
Although it is arguable that options work too well and that they even
caused the market to become overvalued before the correction that began in
2000, it is difficult to believe that the market could be fooled by the
obviously self-interested tactics of a few CEOs. Rather, it seems much
more likely that the accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and
elsewhere acted more like smelling salts and shocked the market into a
corrective reaction. That is not to say, however, that we might not want to
avoid such violent corrections in the future if we can do so.
Ironically, it would be possible to use compensatory stock options to
encourage CEOs to address the problem of overvalued equity. One easy
fix would be to index exercise price downward (but not upward). By
indexing exercise price downward, the CEO would gain if he could ease
down the price of company stock by less than any market-wide decrease in
price. The effect would be for the CEO to view a looming correction as an
opportunity rather than a threat. And perhaps more important, the CEO
would have an incentive to be on the lookout for signs of overvaluation. 
7
15. In my view, executive compensation should be the central concern of corporate
governance. If we can get the rules right about how officers share gains with outside
stockholders, all else follows rather easily.
16. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders and Stock Options-Malfeasance,
Manipulation, Misappropriation. Or Not? (Apr. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author) (concluding that although there are several arguments against the use of stock
options as compensation, "in the end they are the best way to align the interests of officers
and stockholders"). Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that we should do
away with incentive compensation. See Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers
Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1379; IEW Working
Paper No. 187, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-555697 (linking incentive
compensation schemes to corporate scandal); see also Roger Martin, Taking Stock: If You
Want Managers to Act in Their Shareholder's Best Interests, Take Away Their Company
Stock, 81 HARV. Bus. REV. 19 (2003) (arguing that compensation with stock or options
encourages managers to act contrary to the interests of investors); Roger Martin, The Wrong
Incentive: Executives Taking Stock Will Behave Like Athletes Placing Bets, BARRON'S
ONLINE Dec. 22, 2003, http://online.wsj.com/barrons/article/
0,,SB107187920976382100,00.html (drawing an analogy between granting stock-based
compensation and allowing professional athletes to bet on their own teams). Jensen and
Murphy continue ultimately to support the use of stock options.
17. Although many critics of executive compensation have argued that options should
be indexed on the upside because otherwise they reward the CEO for gains that come with a
generally rising market, upward indexing is a bad idea for at least two reasons. First, it
might in fact induce the CEO to undertake even riskier business strategies than he would be
inclined to pursue with a non-indexed option, because he would gain only if he increased
stock price more than the market average. In other words, upward indexing would in fact
exacerbate the problem of overvalued equity (though it is not clear that plain vanilla options
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Another easy fix is to encourage repricing in appropriate situations.
Downward indexing addresses the problem of incentive pay in a falling
market. Yet, what if the problem is company-specific? How do we induce
the CEO of a troubled company to own up to the situation sooner rather
than later? This is not a problem if the board chooses to sack the CEO. If
so, the new CEO can be given new options at the new low price and thus be
encouraged to turn around the situation (though lesser officers may still be
stuck with options that are deep out of the money). In contrast, an
incumbent CEO has every incentive to cover up the bad news. Aside from
the fact that he may get fired, a big drop in company stock price will
eliminate much of the incentive to do a good job going forward. It is much
more common for a troubled company to retain its CEO, presumably
because in most cases the CEO cannot be faulted for a business setback. 8
If the CEO knows that candor is likely to be rewarded with new incentives,
he might well be eager to fess up to the board. The problem is that option
repricing is viewed by many corporate watchdogs as a gratuitous do-over.' 9
do so in a generally rising market). Second, upward indexing ignores the fact that a
company that grows by less than the market average nonetheless contributes to the average.
To be sure, downward indexing rewards the optionee only if the company falls in price by
less than it would be expected to do in a falling market. That may not always be an
adequate reward.
18. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1554 (2006) (noting that the
small risk of being fired will likely not outweigh the large financial upside of an inflated
stock price); Philip E. Strahan, Securities Class Actions, Corporate Governance and
Managerial Agency Problems 18-25 (June 1998), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=104356 (showing that the filing of a securities class action
was found to more than double the likelihood of a CEO turnover, increasing it from 9.8%
before the filing to 23.4% afterwards). See generally Mitu Gulati, When Corporate
Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46
UCLA L. REV. 675 (1999) (discussing disclosure requirements when corporations issue
securities in the middle of a quarter); Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some
Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002)
(discussing incentives in troubled companies).
19. See Robert A.G. Monks, Executive and Director Compensation: 1984 Redux, 6
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 135, 137 (1998) (arguing against current options
policy); Amanda K. Esquibel, A Guide to Challenging Option Repricing, 37 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1117 (2000) (examining if and when shareholders can challenge director option
repricing); see also Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of
Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (2000) (identifying
factors that lead shareholders to accept or reject an options plan). Ironically, recent changes
to accounting rules requiring the expensing of stock option grants may have made it easier
to reprice underwater options. As of 1995, FASB 123 required the expensing of repriced
options and apparently all but eradicated the practice. In other words, FASB 123 required
that a company that repriced its options treat the grant of the new lower-priced option as an
expense that reduces reported earnings. See Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (Oct. 1995). But in 2005, FASB
123R required that all grants of options be expensed. See Share-Based Payment, Revision
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Yet another idea is to permit insider trading. Henry Manne argued
long ago that insider trading could be an important force for market
efficiency since it always moves the market in the correct direction. He
also argued that it does no harm to long term investors and that it would be
an effective way to compensate officers and employees. He later argued
that insider trading was superior to stock options in part because it avoids
difficult questions of how many options to award and the need for periodic
repricing. Most recently he has argued that insider trading can effectively
convey information up the chain of corporate command more reliably than
conventional means of communication.2 °
These are not likely to be popular solutions in the current climate.
The obvious alternative is to make the market more efficient on the
downside. Indeed, aside from recommending some rather technical
changes to how stock options work, Jensen and Murphy recommend that
public companies should establish and maintain contact with short sellers
in order better to understand opposing views of company performance and
prospects. 21 This is not to suggest that we should encourage investors to
bet against the market but rather that we should be sure that we do not
discourage them from doing so. There have been several positive steps in
that direction lately.
As a matter of regulation, the SEC recently abolished the outdated tick
test prohibiting short sales when the last change in the price of a stock was
downward.22 Similarly, the NYSE rescinded Rule 80A that limited index
arbitrage in volatile markets. 23  The SEC has also approved several
of FASB Statement No. 123 (Dec. 2004). Thus, there is no longer any stigma attached to
repricing.
20. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did
Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005); see also Thomas A. Lambert, Overvalued Equity and
the Case for an Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045 (2006)
(arguing for the benefits of price-decreasing insider trading). I have argued that one reason
that companies go public is to gain access to market information as a monitoring device.
Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREP. Bus. L. J.
(forthcoming, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1029966; see also Richard A.
Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-Manager, 2005
U. ILL. L. REV. 269 (2005) (using partnership law to explain to explain the troublesome
aspects of executive compensation).
21. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 13, at 49.
22. See Richard Hill, SEC Votes 5-0 to Adopt Amendments to Reg SHO to Curb Abusive
Short Selling, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 937 (Jun. 18, 2007) (describing the unanimous
vote eliminating the tick test); see also Rachel McTague, Increased Market Volatility Not
Related to End of Short Sale Tick Test, STA Says, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1445 (Sep.
24, 2007) (reporting that Securities Traders Association did not believe that the end of the
Short Sale Tick Test did not cause increased market volatility).
23. See Rachel McTague, NYSE to End Index Arbitrage Collars, Says They Don't Affect
Market Volatility, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1705 (Nov. 5, 2007) (discussing the
proposal to rescind market collars).
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managed exchange-traded funds ("ETFs") that engage in stock-picking and
has announced that it will consider a rule permitting such funds.24
In addition, the markets have evolved to provide more ways to place
downside bets. In late 2002, trading began in single stock futures. 25 What
is more significant is that volume on the options markets has increased
dramatically (probably mostly because of the activities of hedge funds).26
These are significant developments because both markets require equal
numbers of traders on both sides of the market. In the futures market,
someone must take the bet that the stock price will go down. Essentially
the same is true in the options market. With a call, someone must stand
ready to sell if the market goes up. With a put, someone must stand ready
to buy if the market goes down.27
The question that remains is who will step up to the plate to do the
dirty work. It is one thing to develop new trading tools, but it is another
thing for investors to use them. Most of the market today has subscribed to
the ideas of market efficiency and diversification.28 In other words, most
investors have adopted a relatively passive approach to investing. This is
partly a matter of logic and partly a matter of regulation.
As a matter of logic, most investors seem to understand that they
cannot beat the market. To be sure, the market goes up over the long haul.
So, it is possible to make positive long term returns. Yet to beat the market
is to beat the market rate of return. Although such things may happen in
Lake Wobegon, it is impossible in the real world for a majority of investors
to beat the market. By definition, half of all investors will fall below the
median. Experience teaches that it is very difficult for any given investor
24. See SEC to Weigh Rule Proposal on ETF Exemptions, Other Items, 40 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 310 (Mar. 3, 2008) (announcing SEC's decision to consider proposing rule
changes to allow ETFs without requiring individual exemptive orders).
25. See Michael Bologna, OneChicago, NASDAQ LIFFE Exchanges Open, Breaking
Prohibition on Single-Stock Futures, 34 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1876 (Nov. 18, 2002)
(discussing the end of the ban against single stock futures in the U.S. when two exchanges
began trade on Nov. 8, 2002).
26. See Oesterle, supra note 4 (discussing the value that hedge funds add to the
financial markets and arguing against extensive direct regulation by the government).
27. Thus, it is peculiar that the business press makes such a big deal out of booming
commodities markets. When prices in the commodities markets go up, sellers lose just as
much as buyers gain. To cheer rising prices is rather like cheering inflation. On the other
hand, one might legitimately cheer increasing volume or open interest, as the partners of
Duke Brothers more or less explained to Billy Ray Valentine in the movie TRADING PLACES
(Paramount Pictures 1983). The truly remarkable thing about the commodities market (and
the derivatives market in general) is the should-be gain from a zero-sum transaction. The
gain-reduction of risk-is difficult to value but it is very real. Otherwise the commodities
markets would not in fact be booming.
28. See generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an
Incentive Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21 (2006) (arguing that "outsider trading" is, for a
number of reasons, a beneficial practice).
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to maintain an edge for long.
But wait, there's more. Investors also realize that they can eliminate
the risk that goes with holding individual stocks by holding a diversified
portfolio of stocks. The iron law of investing is that one must get more
return if one takes more risk. By the same token, because a diversified
investor takes less risk, a diversified investor is willing to pay more for
individual stocks than is an all-your-eggs-in-one-basket stock picker. Thus,
diversified investors ultimately set the prices for all investors. In effect, an
undiversified investor overpays. Accordingly, all investors are forced to
diversify or to assume more risk. As with Gresham's Law, diversified
investors drive out undiversified investors.29
Finally, trading is costly. The payment of commissions reduces
returns. The bottom line is that for most investors, the sensible thing to do
is to diversify and minimize trading.3" To be sure, one must trade
occasionally in order to remain well-diversified. When a stock increases in
value, it may become over-weighted, and when a stock decreases in value,
it may become under-weighted. So some amount of trading is necessitated
by diversification. But not much. In a well-diversified portfolio, it is
unlikely that picking a winner will make much difference to aggregate
return. So why bother?
Accordingly, it is not surprising that institutional investors tend to
follow the logic of the efficient market and diversification. It is risky to try
to beat the market. The danger for a mutual fund or pension plan is that
one will underperform compared to others. While it is a good thing to beat
the market, it is a worse thing to be beaten by the market. Moreover,
because mutual funds, pension plans, and other institutional investors are
fiduciaries for those who invest through such vehicles, it is not clear that
they may assume unnecessary risk consistent with their fiduciary duty.
Finally, most such institutional investors are contractually bound in effect
to pursue their advertised investment strategies.
If mutual funds, pension plans, and other institutional investors have
opted out of the hunt for misvalued stocks, who will keep the market
efficient? Hedge funds are an obvious answer; and they may be the most
important answer. It is not clear that there is any other significant sector of
the market that can do the job. In order to get a handle on how important
29. I have never heard anyone else make this point and am thus tempted to name this
Booth's Law if only to avoid explaining it repeatedly.
30. A recent study by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French found that 17.9% of market
capitalization is invested through index funds and that on the average investors who invest
through managed funds pay 0.67% more in expenses than do investors who invest in index
funds. See Mark Hulbert, Can You Beat the Market? It's a $100 Billion Question, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, at B6 (summarizing the findings of Fama & French in the paper
authored by Kenneth French, The Cost of Active Investing (Tuck Sch. of Bus. Working
Paper, 2008) available at http://ssm.com/abstract - 1105775)).
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hedge funds may be for market efficiency, one needs a sense of who owns
stock and how much they are likely to trade. This calls for some serious
back of the envelope analysis.
III. WHO IS THE MARKET?
According to the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") data, there is about
$22.5 trillion outstanding in equity of U.S. corporations. About $6 trillion
is held by entities other than financial institutions, government agencies, or
foreign entities. Of this amount, about $2 trillion is held by hedge funds.
The remainder is held by nonprofits (about $1 trillion), various types of
private equity funds (VC funds, LBO funds, and others) (about $1 trillion),
and individual investors.31
A large majority of stock by dollar value (about $14 trillion) is held by
U.S. investment companies (such as mutual funds) and retirement funds
that are largely precluded from using many of the tactics used by hedge
funds. About $3 trillion is held by foreign investors, most of whom are
presumably institutions. (Although one often hears that mutual funds now
own more stock than do individuals, that is a significant understatement. If
one assumes that foreign holdings are also institutional holdings, then non-
institutional holdings of U.S. stocks is about 27%. In other words,
institutions own about 73% of all stock by value.)
The Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA") limits the ability of
mutual funds to engage in stock picking.32 ICA section 5 defines a
"diversified company" as one that has 75% of its assets invested such that
no more than 5% of its assets are attributable to any one issuer.33 In
addition, ICA section 5 also provides that a diversified company may not
34hold more than ten percent of the voting securities of any one issuer.
These same limitations are also incorporated into the Internal Revenue
Code ("I.R.C."). I.R.C. section 851 provides pass-through treatment for the
income of a regulated investment company ("RIC") and defines a RIC by
the same standards as those that define a diversified company under the
31 .See App., tbl. 1. Estimates of equity holdings of nonprofits based on historical data
in FRB Flow of Funds ("FOF"), tbl. L.101a. For equity holdings for hedge funds, LBO
funds, and private equity funds, see Plenty of Alternatives, But Hedge Funds and Private
Equity Have Their Limits, in Money for Old Hope (Special Supplement), THE ECONOMIST,
Feb. 28, 2008, at 11-12. Holdings by individuals apparently also include inter-corporate
holdings.
32. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a-l-80b-2 (1940).
33. Subclassification of Management companies, ICA § 5, 15 U.S.C. 80a-5.
34. See generally Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America:
A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U.L. REV. 225 (2007)
(comparing the business environments and regulatory regimes affecting different types of
institutional investors).
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ICA.35
In addition, and as to all funds whether classified as diversified or not,
ICA section 12 prohibits an investment company from buying securities on
margin and from effecting short sales as the SEC may provide by rule.36
Although the SEC has issued no such rules, ICA section 18(f) prohibits
leverage in excess of 33% for open-end companies.37 In other words, a
mutual fund must have assets equal to at least 300% of liabilities, including
any outstanding preferred stock or obligations assumed in connection with
hedging transactions. Moreover, the SEC generally requires that the fund
set aside liquid assets in an amount equal to any such senior obligation
assumed.38 Thus, in practice, the SEC lumps leverage together with
transactions in various derivatives (including writing traditional options).
Moreover, the practice is for investment companies to seek a no-action
letter in connection with any such obligation. The SEC generally requires
the applicant to promise not to use any derivative instrument for purposes
other than hedging. In other words, the SEC effectively prohibits the use of
derivatives for speculation.39
Finally, all registered investment companies must be careful to abide
by stated investment objectives, and the SEC has signaled that a fund that
engages in short sales and transactions in derivatives must assure that it
complies with its stated objective and has obtained any necessary investor
approval.4°
To be sure, there is significant wiggle room in the rules relating to
diversification. But most funds do not exploit the full array of
possibilities. 4 They do not make large bets on one or a few companies.
Rather, they choose to diversify well beyond what the law suggests. I use
35. Definition of Regulated Investment Company, I.R.C. § 851 (1986).
36. Functions and Activities of Investment Companies, ICA § 12, 15 U.S.C. 80a-12.
37. Capital Structure of Investment Companies, ICA § 18(f).
38. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 38-43 (discussing the use of
leverage by registered investment companies and the use of and regulations surrounding
short selling by hedge funds). The rules are a bit more liberal for closed-end companies,
because a closed-end company need not stand ready to redeem shares on demand as must an
open-end company (mutual fund).
39. See Jeffrey S. Rosen, et al., Hedging by Investment Companies: Legal Implications
Under the Commodity Exchange Act and Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 260 (Feb. 8, 1985) (discussing the rules and actions of primary federal
regulators, particularly the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
governing hedging by investment companies).
40. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 38-43 (discussing the regulations
surrounding short sales).
41. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A
Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U.L. REv. 225 (2007)
(discussing how individual fund managers have little incentive to discipline corporate
wrongdoing).
HEDGE FUNDS AND OVERVALUED EQUITY
the word "suggests" on purpose because there is no benefit under the ICA
or SEC regulations that goes with being diversified. Although a fund
would presumably be precluded from holding itself out as diversified if it
violated the definition set forth in the ICA, such a result does not explain
why the vast majority of funds diversify well beyond legal requirements.
The answer may be that investment companies (whether diversified or not)
cannot be sufficiently aggressive in placing big bets on one or a few
companies to make it worth the risk of doing so. As a result, investment
companies are forced to the other extreme of minimizing risk through
diversification, because there is nothing to be gained from a middling
strategy.42 In other words, federal securities law and SEC rules have
effectively mandated diversification through a series of seemingly minor
restrictions.
Although retirement plans and pension plans are not necessarily
subject to the ICA, most such plans (other than state sponsored plans) are
subject to ERISA, which requires generally that plan investments be
diversified.43 Even if ERISA did not mandate diversification, the general
42. This distresses some mutual fund investors who argue that many supposedly
managed funds are closet index funds. Thus, many financial websites that offer information
and analysis about mutual funds include a calculation of R-Squared for each fund which
effectively measures the extent to which a fund correlates with an index. A similar
complaint is that fund managers are given to a herd mentality when it comes to choosing
stocks. While this complaint may be another way of saying that funds are too diversified or
may be the result of a failure to appreciate the implications of diversification for a large
fund-there are only so many stocks in the world-it may also be a complaint that fund
managers choose stocks that are popular among other managers because of fashion rather
than analysis or as a way of hedging against choosing a bad stock. There is safety in
numbers. Misery loves company. On the other hand, some investors and investment
advisers advocate holding a diversified portfolio of funds in order to avoid the risk that goes
with any one fund manager. This suggests that some investors want more diversification
than can be offered by any one fund, but it is not clear why such investors do not simply
invest in an index fund. See James M. Park & Jeremy C. Staum, Diversification: How
Much is Enough? (Mar. 1998), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=85428. If it is true that
funds are more diversified than they need to be, the distribution of returns should be tighter
than the market as a whole. This may account for increasing alpha risk.
43. See, e.g., Difelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410, 424 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[A]ny
participant-driven 401 (k) plan structured to comport with section 404(c) of ERISA would be
prudent, then, so long as a fiduciary could argue that a participant could, and should, have
further diversified his risk."); Cal. Ironworkers Field Pension Trust v. Loomis Sayles & Co.,
259 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (ruling that an investment manager of a trust governed by
ERISA must act in a prudent manner and thus has a duty to diversify the investments of the
trust); Meinhardt v. Unisys Corp. (In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig.), 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir.
1996) ("The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to exercise prudence in diversifying
the investments so as to minimize the risk of large losses, and therefore he should not invest
a disproportionately large part of the trust estate in a particular security or type of
security."); GIW Industries, Inc. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 895 F.2d 729
(11 th Cir. 1990) (determining that a fiduciary has a duty to diversify investments in order to
minimize the risk of losses); Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir.
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law of trusts does so.44 However, these are modest requirements. Most
plans are much more diversified than the law requires. To be sure, pension
plans-particularly state plans and union plans-have been a good deal
more vocal about corporate governance than mutual funds have been, but
few plans make big bets on one or a few stocks. In some cases, plans are
invested in funds that are also governed by the ICA. In other cases, it may
be that plans mimic the behavior of funds because of a herd mentality that
it is more important to avoid losses than to achieve gains. Ultimately the
explanation for eschewing much effort to beat the market is likely the same
as it is for mutual funds. It is just too risky to do so.
45
Finally, institutional investors who want to gain the benefit of more
aggressive strategies can always invest in a hedge fund.46 If institutional
investors can avoid regulatory restrictions by farming out more promising
strategies that they cannot pursue on their own, presumably they will do
1989) (holding that there is a duty to diversify plan investments to minimize risk). The
requirement does not apply to employee stock ownership plans, although (regrettably) many
beneficiaries confuse such plans (which are better seen as incentive plans) with retirement
plans. Of course, there is nothing to prohibit an employee from investing her entire
retirement account in employer stock voluntarily. In some cases employees may be
pressured into doing so in order to show loyalty to the employer firm. This can be a
dangerous strategy for other reasons, as where an employee holds stock after exercising
options and the stock then falls dramatically in price. In extreme cases, there may not be
enough value remaining to pay tax on the income realized from exercise. Nevertheless,
ERISA still effectively prohibits an employer from providing investment advice to
employees, even though the Enron debacle led to calls for reform in this regard. See Nancy
E. Oates & Cynthia B. Brown, Time to Rethink Your 401(k) Plan? Pension Protection Act
Allows Employers to Redesign Retirement Plans, 203 J. ACCT. 50 (2007) (discussing the
changes implemented through the enactment of the Pension Protection Act).
44. See Robertson v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 47 F.3d 1268 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that the duty of prudence under New Jersey investment law implies a duty to
diversify in making or retaining trust investments); Ehrlich v. First Nat'l Bank of Princeton,
505 A.2d 220, 233-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (ruling for the same proposition);
Richard A. Booth, The Suitability Rule, Investor Diversification, and Using Spread to
Measure Risk, 54 Bus. LAW. 1599 (1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-200388
(discussing the practice of investor diversification).
45. The SEC has suggested that hedge funds may serve the interests of ordinary
investors by affording an opportunity to invest in something that is uncorrelated with
general market movements. SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at xii, 4-5. The same
argument supposedly may justify investment in a fund of hedge funds, despite the fact that
the investor may pay multiple levels of fees with such an investment. This is a peculiar
argument. If a diversified investor has eliminated alpha risk by investing (say) in an index
fund, what is the point of adding some of it back by also investing in a hedge fund? To be
sure, it may be that indexing does not in fact eliminate as much risk as other methods might.
But then it is important to explain what the unaddressed risk is and how a hedge fund can
address it.
46. See id. at 67-72. The cost is that the ultimate investor may end up paying multiple
fees. Again, this is the primary worry about funds of funds.
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so.
4
' The effect is to further concentrate stock picking among hedge funds.
All this is not to say that investors are ill served by diversification. To
the contrary, most investors-indeed almost all investors-should be well
diversified. They have no business trying to beat the market. But it is
important that someone tries to beat the market.
IV. WHAT MOTIVATES TRADING?
As an initial matter, it is important to understand that every trade has
two sides: a buy and a sell. Reported volume on the NYSE reflects
matched pairs of buys and sells. However, reported volume on NASDAQ
reflects buys and sells independently because in most cases buyers and
sellers trade with a market maker. Thus, NASDAQ reports two trades in
effect when the NYSE (and the AMEX) would report just one.48 So when
comparing NASDAQ volume with NYSE volume it is common to look at
twice total volume ("TTV") in NYSE stocks. The point for present
purposes is that in discussing what motivates trading, one must recognize
that each trade has two sides, thus two motivations. There is no reason to
assume that the buyer and the seller are similarly motivated. Accordingly,
one must be careful to consider the data in light of TTV when it is
appropriate to do so. This same issue can arise in other contexts. For
example, portfolio turnover is generally measured in terms of matched
pairs of buys and sells. If a mutual fund sells all of the stock in its portfolio
during the course of the year and uses the proceeds to buy other stocks, its
turnover ratio is 100%. In other words, if total dollar sales during the
course of the year are equal to the dollar value of the portfolio, turnover is
100% even though reinvestment of the proceeds in other stocks will entail
yet again as much trading activity as did sales (other things equal). The
convention is to count sales but not purchases in calculating portfolio
turnover.
It is surprisingly difficult to determine who trades and why with any
precision. 49 But it is possible to piece together significant information on
47. ERISA insulates plan administrators from much of any duty in connection with
investments. See id. at 28. See generally J.W. Verret, Economics Makes Strange
Bedfellows: Pensions, Trusts, and Hedge Funds in an Era of Financial Re-Intermediation,
10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 63 (2007).
48. This data is further complicated because there is a significant amount of trading in
NYSE listed stocks on NASDAQ. For the year 2007, NASDAQ accounted for about one-
fourth of the trading in NYSE listed stocks. See NYSE, Volume in NYSE Listed Issues,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=3075
&category=3 (showing the amount of NASDAQ stocks trading in NYSE stocks in 2007).
49. The question of how much trading is motivated by stock-picking as opposed to
other motivations is important for other reasons as well. For example, it is important in
estimating the damages in a securities fraud class action to know how much of the volume
2008]
894 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:4
the subject. It has been estimated that about 30% of all trading-15%
roundtrip equivalent-is attributable to hedge funds.5° At first, that figure
seems significant, but not overwhelmingly important. On the other hand,
that 15% may be a large proportion of the volume attributable to stock
picking. Recent studies indicate that in the U. S., stock picking has
declined from about 60% in the 1960s to about 24% in the early 2000s. "1
in the subject stock is attributable to in-and-out trading (such as by market makers and
arbitrageurs) as opposed to investment. See Richard A. Booth, Taking Certification
Seriously--Why There Is No Such Thing as an Adequate Representative in a Securities
Fraud Class Action (Nov. 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1026768 (explaining
the difficulty in finding an adequate class representative in a securities fraud class action).
50. See Rachel McTague, Increased Market Volatility Not Related to End of Short Sale
Tick Test, STA Says, 39 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1445 (Sep. 24, 2007) (explaining that
hedge funds account for about 30% of all U.S. equity trading volume); see also Henry
Tricks, The Biggest Bets in the World, PROSPECT, Nov. 16, 2006 (noting that in the U.S.
hedge funds hold 5% of assets under management-a fraction of the vast sums controlled by
pension funds, mutual funds and other institutional investors-but generate 30% of all
trading activity); Stephen Ellis, Watchdog's Bid to Clip Hedge Funds Fails, Despite Fears,
THE AUSTRALIAN (Australia), July 7, 2006, Finance, Greenback, at 20 (explaining that
hedge funds account for about 30% of all trading on U.S. equity markets); Susan Morris,
Controversy and Debate Surrounding Hedge Funds, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE REVIEW, Aug. 6,
2006 (asserting that 18 to 22% of all trading on the NYSE is related to hedge funds
according to Priya Jestin on Hedge Fund Street); Benj Gallander & Ben Stadelmann, Where
Will the Young Lions Turn Now?, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Sep. 17, 2007, at B9
(portraying that the hedge fund Citadel is responsible for as much as 3% of all trading on the
NYSE each day); Gary Parkinson, Man Group Shrugs Off Turbulent Markets to Record
Surging Sales, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sep. 30, 2006 (demonstrating that hedge funds
are now estimated to account for about 40% of all trading in London on any given day);
Greenwich Associates, In U.S. Fixed Income, Hedge Funds Are the Biggest Game In Town,
Aug. 30, 2007, available at http://www.greenwich.com/WMA/in the news/pressreleases/
1,1638,,00.html?rtOrigin=G&vgnvisitor-fKWdmqCLoA (asserting that hedge funds now
account for more than half of all trading in some important areas of the U.S. fixed income
markets); CSFB Equity Research, European Wholesale Banks: Hedge Funds and
Investment Banks, at 5 (Mar. 9, 2005) (illustrating that hedge funds controlled 70% of all
U.S. trading in exchange-traded fund volume in 2004).
51. Recent studies indicate that only about one-quarter of trading volume is motivated
by stock picking, while the remaining three-quarters are motivated by other strategies such
as portfolio balancing, tax planning, arbitrage, and so forth. See Utpal Bhattacharya & Neal
E. Galpin, Is Stock Picking Declining Around the World?, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings
Paper (Nov. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-849627 (estimating the proportion
of trades attributable to stock picking based on the assumption that the volume of trading
should be proportional to market capitalization). The proportion of stock picking tends to
be higher in less developed markets. See Martijn Cremers & Jianping Mei, Turning Over
Turnover (Yale Int'l Ctr. Fin., Working Paper No. 03-26, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=452720 (examining factors in stock turnover); see also Martijn
Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New Measure that
Predicts Performance, AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper (Oct. 3, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891719 (finding that more active managers of non-index funds
outperform less active managers); Meir Statman, et al., Investor Overconfidence and
Trading Volume, AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings (Mar. 2003), available at
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Also, it is predicted that stock picking will eventually stabilize at about
11% (22% TTV).52 This is somewhat surprising because idiosyncratic
risk-alpha risk-appears to have increased over the same period. 3 On the
other hand, it may be that alpha risk has increased precisely because stock
picking has decreased. But the point is that trading by hedge funds may
account for virtually all of the stock picking that goes on in U.S. markets. 4
The obvious question is what accounts for all of the remaining trading.
Mutual funds presumably account for much of the remainder. Average
turnover among mutual funds is about 47% per year.55 It seems fair to
assume that turnover is about the same among other institutional investors.
Since institutional investors own 73% of all stock, institutional investors in
the aggregate likely account for about 34% of all trading activity.
Another major source of trading activity is program trading, which
accounts for about 36% TTV or 18% roundtrip 6 In addition, specialists
and market makers appear to account for about 46% TTV or 23% of
roundtrip trading on the NYSE.57
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 168472 (investigating trading volumes and investor
overconfidence). For a treatment of trading frequency from a legal point of view, see Paul
G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 VA. L. REv. 713 (1995)
(suggesting explanations for excessive trading)l Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly
Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REv. 611
(1995) (using rational choice analysis and information theory to explain stock trading);
Lynn A. Stout, Agreeing to Disagree over Excessive Trading, 81 VA. L. REv. 751 (1995)
(explaining disagreement over theories explaining investor trading). It is possible that the
mix of investors varies from one corporation to the next. That is, it is possible that a
particular corporation may attract the disproportionate attention of stock pickers. However,
for most companies, a majority of the trading appears to be motivated by other factors.
52. See id.
53. See Roger G. Ibbotson & Peng Chen, Sources of Hedge Fund Returns: Alphas,
Betas, and Costs (Yale Int'l Ctr. Fin., Working Paper No. 05-17, 2005), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=733264 (finding that most hedge fund returns come from alpha
risk).
54. Both estimates appear to be based on trades involving hedge funds and stock
picking, respectively. In other words, the other side of this trading seems likely to be taken
by market makers. Accordingly, both percentages should be halved for TTV purposes. The
fact that hedge fund trading appears to exceed stock picking can be explained by the fact
that hedge funds engage in a variety of strategies other than stock picking.
55. See ICI, 2007 Investment Company Fact Book, at 23, available at
http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2007_factbook.pdf (providing statistics on mutual funds).
56. See NYSE, Market Activity / NYSE Monthly Program Trading,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/Default.aspx?tabid=115 (demonstrating that for the last
week of 3Q 2007, program trading on the NYSE accounted for 42% of all trading); see also
NYSE News Release, Program Trading Data for Sep. 24-28 (Oct. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1191494184176.html (defining program trading as the purchase
or sale of fifteen or more stocks with a total value of $1M or more).
57. The NYSE reports specialist participation directly. For the year 2007, specialist
activity averaged about 3%. Specialist participation has been dropping dramatically in
recent years from about 15% in 2001. See NYSE, Specialist Activity,
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New issues account for relatively little trading. Among U.S.
investors, new issues of stock totaled $119 billion (domestic) and $138
billion (foreign) in 2006. In addition, closed end funds, ETFs, and Real
Estate Investment Trusts ("REITs") issued $105 billion in new shares. But
during the same period, corporations repurchased far more of their own
stock (as is typical for almost all years since 1980). Among nonfinancial
corporations, new issues of stock totaled $56 billion ($43 billion in IPOs)
but repurchases resulted in a net decrease of $614 billion. In other words,
in 2006 nonfinancial corporations sold $56 billion in stock but repurchased
$670 billion. Among financial corporations, new issues totaled $63 billion,
but among operating companies (as opposed to closed end funds, ETFs,
and REITs), repurchases exceeded issues by $47 billion. Thus, it appears
that repurchases among financial corporations equaled $110 billion. All
said, trading attributable to sales and repurchases of stock by issuers in
2006 equaled $1142 billion or about 5.5% of the $20,909 billion in stock
outstanding as of year end 2006. Assuming market-wide turnover of about
120%, issuers were involved in about 4.6% of all trades and accounted for
2.3% TTV in 2006.58
The following table summarizes the sources of trading activity as
estimated above.
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode-table&key=3083
&category=3 (illustrating the decline in specialist activity in recent years). Market maker
participation is inferred from NASDAQ volume in NYSE listed shares, which equaled about
43% in December 2006. (Data for 2007 is confused by alternative modes of reporting TRF
and ADF volume.) See NYSE, Volume in NYSE Listed Issues, http://www.nyxdata.com/
nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer edition.asp?mode-table&key=3075&category=3 (showing
volume in NYSE listed issues).
58. See FRB, Statistical Supplement, Table 1.46, New Security Issues, U.S.
Corporations (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/
2008/01/table 146.htm (providing data regarding new issues of stock); see also FRB, Flow
of Funds Accounts for the United States, Table F.213, Table L.213 (Dec. 2007) (providing
data regarding repurchases); FRB, Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Table 1.46 (Jan. 2008) (providing data regarding holdings); App., tbls. 1 & 4 (providing
data regarding turnover). These figures are somewhat at odds with those reported by Fama
and French, who report net issues and lower levels of repurchases. See Eugene F. Fama &
Kenneth R. French, Financing Decisions: Who Issues Stock?, CRSP Working Paper No.
549 (Apr. 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-429640 (finding higher new issues
and lower repurchases). Many of the issue and repurchase activities are attributable to the
exercise of stock options. For example, for the year 2000, among the 10,883 largest U.S.
companies, total executive compensation was $68 billion. Assuming that gains from the
exercise of stock options account for about half of executive compensation, and that gains
from the exercise of options average about 15% per year, one can estimate that companies
issued about $200 billion in stocks and repurchased a similar amount.
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SOURCE PERCENT OF TRADING ACTIVITY
Institutional Investors 34
Program Trading 18
Specialists & Market Makers 23
Issuers 2
Hedge Funds 15
Other / New Investment 8
TOTAL 100
To be sure, it is possible that institutional investors engage in some
stock picking. But much of the trading of institutional investors is likely to
be explained by passive portfolio balancing strategies. The S&P 500 itself
had a turnover rate of 5.21% for the year 2007.' 9 For indices of smaller
stocks, the turnover rate was nearly 20% and the overall turnover for the
S&P Composite 1500 was 6.90%.60 This turnover is the result of
occasional adjustments to the composition of the index, including
constructive sales of over-weighted stocks and stocks dropped from the
index, and purchases of under-weighted stocks and stocks added to the
index. Moreover, turnover in the index may be magnified in the real world.
As funds trade to achieve balance, stock prices move in reaction,
necessitating further trading. One can call it an echo effect or feedback.
Indeed, the price effect that attends the addition (or subtraction) of a stock
to (or from) a major index is well known. Moreover, it is also widely
recognized that the trading decisions of major mutual funds can move the
market in a stock. Thus, it should not be surprising to see that index funds
exhibit even more turnover than the index itself. For example, in 2007,
among Vanguard's general domestic stock index funds turnover averaged
14.05%. Among its more aggressive domestic stock index funds turnover
averaged 31.74%. 6I And Vanguard is noted for its conservative approach
to trading.
The above figures do not include trading in derivative products. In
2007, NYSE volume was 532 billion shares.62 Total volume on the options
markets was about 187 billion shares (1.87 billion contracts).63  Single
59. See App., tbl. 5, S&P Capitalization Weighted Turnover.
60. See id.
61. See App., tbl. 6, Turnover in Vanguard Index Funds.
62. See App., tbl. 3, Selected Data for Equity Options.
63. See id. This is my estimation based on Chicago Board Option Exchange ("CBOE")
data and on the fact that CBOE volume equaled about 26% of total market volume. See
NYSE Group Share and Dollar Volume in NYSE Listed, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/
asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=2959&category=3 (last visited Apr. 15,
2008) (reporting the total volume of options in 2007).
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stock futures accounted for only about 784 million shares. 64 Thus, trading
in options effectively adds about 35% to the total volume of trading.
Intuitively, much of the trading in derivative products seems likely to be
attributable to hedge funds. Institutional investors are largely precluded
from such investments other than for hedging purposes. Additionally,
although market makers may occasionally find derivative products useful,
they presumably remain market neutral for the most part and thus have
relatively little need for hedging.
The volume of trading has increased dramatically in recent years. In
1960, turnover in NYSE listed shares was 12%. Although turnover was as
high as 73% in 1987, it has been above 50% consistently only since 1993.65
In 2007, it was 130%.66 In January 2008, it was a record 158%.67
Similarly, the volume of trading in options has increased by approximately
25% per year in the last few years according to CBOE data.68
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS
The foregoing data suggest that hedge funds may account for most of
the price discovery that goes on in the U.S. markets. The implication is
that we should be careful not to impede that function with any effort to
regulate the activities of hedge funds. The predictable response is that a
little disclosure never hurt anyone. So who could possibly object to the
requirement that hedge fund managers register with the SEC? Never mind
the fact that the SEC has no authority to require registration, as we
discovered when the courts struck down such a rule in 2006.69 The answer
is that information is the most valuable commodity in the securities
business. It can be difficult to predict the effect of requiring disclosure
even of something as innocuous as one's identity.
Experience teaches that disclosure requirements can have unintended
consequences. For example, it is arguable that the registration
64. See id. (providing the amount of the single stock futures in 2007).
65. See id., at App., tbl. 4 (providing data regarding turnover).
66. It is my calculation based on the share volume from NYSE data. Dollar turnover
tends to be slightly higher. See NYSE, Facts & Figures, Market Activity, NYSE Group
Turnover, http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/Default.aspx?tabid=l 15 (last visited Apr. 15,
2008) (reporting the turnover rate of 2007).
67. See NYSE, Facts & Figures, Market Activity, NYSE Group Turnover,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/Default.aspx?tabid=1 15 (last visited Apr. 15, 2008)
(reporting data regarding turnover).
68. See CBOE, 2006 Market Statistics, at 124 (Equity Options Contract Volume by
Exchange) (showing 30.8% increase in total volume for all exchanges from 2005 to 2006).
69. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (striking down the SEC
registration rule); see also Note, District of Columbia Circuit Vacates Securities and
Exchange Commission's "Hedge Fund Rule", 120 HARV. L. REV. 1394 (2007) (analyzing
Goldstein from the perspective of agency rulemaking).
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requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 have led to the systematic
underpricing of IPOs.7 ° It is almost certain that the Williams Act increased
the size of tender offer premiums and reduced the number of takeovers.7
Is there any real danger that regulation would reduce informed
trading? The experience with insider trading may be instructive. Indeed,
the crackdown on insider trading that began in the late 1960s may be
connected to the rise of hedge funds. One effect of prohibiting insider
trading is to transfer the right to be the first to trade on new information,
presumably farther from the source of the information. Thus, the
information becomes less reliable. As it becomes more dispersed, it gives
rise to more trading. So it should not be surprising that trading volume has
increased at the same time that alpha risk has increased. It may be that
hedge funds have evolved as they have because it has become too
expensive for smaller investors to ferret out information or to act on it. In
addition, in a recent article, Henry Manne seems to suggest (possibly
inadvertently) that the SEC's campaign against insider trading was
tolerated, if not encouraged, by ensconced managers who preferred not to
be monitored so efficiently.7z
If there is any truth to this notion, then it may be that it is much more
important to let hedge funds do what they do. Information will out.
Building another ring of legal dams to hold it back will only lead to a leak
somewhere else. Unless there is a pretty good reason to worry about hedge
funds, there is a pretty good reason to do nothing.
The problems with hedge funds that have been identified to date fall
into three categories.
The first category is unpredictable events like LTCM. There is little
to do here precisely because the events are unpredictable. Although there
may be temporary pain involved, the market invariably adjusts.
The second category comprises problems that are already the subject
of regulation and that have attracted the involvement of hedge funds.
70. See Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2
ENTREP. Bus. L. J. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1029966
(analyzing the effect of the registration requirements of Securities Act on the pricing of
IPOs).
71. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (analyzing
the effect of Williams Act on takeover).
72. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That
Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005) (discussing the role of insider trading in the
corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets). For an argument
that the rules against insider trading should be extended, see Ian Ayres & Joe Bankman,
Substitutes for Insider Trading, 54 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2001) and Ian Ayres & Stephen
Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313 (2002). For a contrary view,
see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21 (2006).
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These include vote buying (and selling), trading in bankruptcy claims, and
so forth. Here, hedge funds are subject to the same regulations that govern
the rest of the world. When a hedge fund acquires five percent of the stock
of a public company, it must file Form 13D. 3 (It has been clear from the
beginning that this requirement extends to groups that agree to act in
unison.)74 When a hedge fund acquires ten percent of the stock of a public
company, it becomes subject to section 16 of the Exchange Act.75 And
hedge funds are also subject to the same Department of Treasury position
limits as everyone else.76
The third category includes problems that are unique to hedge funds
because they are hedge funds. If we exclude the inherent problem that
hedge funds are private pools of capital that try to keep their activities as
secret as possible, it is not clear that any real problems of this sort have
been identified. Ultimately, a hedge fund is nothing more than an
investment partnership (regardless of the form of organization that it might
take). It is really quite unthinkable that we should in any way regulate the
behavior of individuals who get together to invest just because they have
gotten together to invest.
On the other hand, we should not subsidize the activities of hedge
funds or other undiversified investors. The dustup surrounding the 1992
spinoff by Marriott is instructive.77 In that case, four investors (including
three hedge funds) purchased most of Marriott's convertible preferred stock
and shorted an equal amount of common stock. The proceeds from
shorting the common stock were almost sufficient to pay for the preferred
stock and thus had the effect of magnifying the dividend on the preferred
stock from 8.25% to almost 50% per year. Meanwhile, the price of the
common stock increased because of the proposed spinoff, and the price of
the convertible preferred stock increased accordingly. Then, as a result of a
dispute with bondholders, the settlement of which required Marriott to set
aside a substantial sum of cash, Marriott announced that it would suspend
the payment of dividends on the preferred stock. This did not matter much
as far as conventional preferred stock investors were concerned because
they could convert before the spinoff and cash out at a significant gain. But
those investors who had shorted the common stock stood to lose what they
had paid (net) for the preferred stock because they were obligated to close
73. See SEC HEDGE FuND REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
74. See, e.g., Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973)
(requiring a Form 13D in such a group situation); see also Morales v. Quintel
Entertainment, Inc., 249 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (extending group concept to §16(b)
disgorgement of short-swing profits).
75. See SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
76. See id. at 29.
77. HB Korenvaes Invs., L.P. v. Marriott Corp., No. 12922, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105
(July 1, 1993).
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out their short positions. As one might expect, the investors sued, claiming
that Marriott had announced the dividend suspension in order to force
conversion before the spinoff. (One theory was that the preferred stock
would become convertible into a controlling interest of old Marriott after
the spinoff because the number of conversion shares would be increased by
anti-dilution provisions.) But the essential argument was that the
corporation had a fiduciary duty to the preferred stockholders not to thwart
their reasonable expectations without a legitimate business reason. The
court declined to speculate about Marriott's motivations and limited its
review to the stated terms of the preferred stock.
The point for present purposes is that the court refused to consider the
peculiar circumstances of the complaining investors even though there was
every reason to think that Marriott knew about their strategy. With the
explosion of derivative instruments, there is no limit to the ability of
investors to synthesize unique positions. Issuers have little control over
what investors do with their securities. For example, a company cannot
prevent a market in options on its stock from emerging, nor should it be
able to do so.78 Of course, this does not mean that issuers are obligated to
consider the wants and needs of options investors.
This is not to say that the courts should not consider the interests of
investors generally. As I have argued elsewhere, securities fraud class
actions do not serve the interests of diversified investors except insofar as
the issuer recovers for amounts that insiders have misappropriated or for
reputational harm. Those claims would be better handled by a derivative
action. Otherwise, a diversified investor who trades now and then for
portfolio balancing purposes (either directly or through a mutual fund) is
equally likely to gain as to lose from (so called) securities fraud. In other
words, a diversified investor is equally likely to sell a stock as to buy a
stock during the fraud period. Over time, gains and losses balance out,
whereas the cost of litigation is a deadweight loss. Moreover, because the
issuer pays, holders always lose. Since investors are about equally likely to
hold as to trade, it seems quite clear that they should be opposed to
securities fraud class actions. The problem is that some investors are not
diversified. An undiversified investor (such as a hedge fund) may well
favor securities fraud class actions as a legal institution because they serve
as an insurance policy against some types of losses. But it is diversified
investors who pay the premium for such insurance. In effect, diversified
investors subsidize the activities of hedge funds and other undiversified
investors through a tax in the form of securities fraud class actions. This is
illogical. At the very least, hedge funds should pay their own way.
78. But see Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of
Trading Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411 (1996) (suggesting otherwise).
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CONCLUSION
When James Buchanan won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1986,
he was purportedly asked what advice he would give to the President about
managing the economy. His purported response was "Don't just do
something. Sit there." That is good advice as well for those who would
regulate hedge funds simply because they are hedge funds.
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TABLE 1: OWNERSHIP OF U.S. EQUITY BY INVESTOR CATEGORY
(FRB Data for 3Q 2007)
(billions of dollars)
Total Market Capitalization7 9
Households (including nonprofits)"
Foreign Holdings of US Issues
Life Insurance Companies
Retirement Funds
Mutual Funds
Other8'
22445
6083
2824
1540
5007
6357
636
Note that for the same period, net noncorporate purchases of stock equaled
$400B and net corporate repurchases equaled $846B. 82
79. This figure includes $490 1B in foreign securities held by U.S. investors. It does not
include intercorporate holdings.
80. This figure also includes hedge funds, private equity funds, and intercorporate
holdings.
81. Rounding error is (2). N
82 FRB FOF Table F.213 (December 6, 2007).
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TABLE 2: SELECTED NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE DATA
Market Capitalization (9/2007)"3 $127,831B
Shares Outstanding (9/2007)84
Dollar Volume (2007)85
Share Volume (2007)86
Dollar Turnover (2007)87
Share Turnover (2007)88
Margin Debt (EOY 2007)89
Program Trading (3Q 2007) 90
Short Interest (EOY 2007)91
Specialist Activity (2007)92
420,421M shares
$21,868B
531,948M shares
123%
127%
323B
34.9%
3.4%
3.2%
83. NYSE, Listed Companies, NYSE Group Shares Outstanding and Market
Capitalization of Companies Listed (2007), http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/
viewer edition.asp?mode--table&key=3092&category=5.
84. Id.
85. NYSE, Market Activity, Group Share and Dollar Volume in NYSE Listed (2007),
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=3070
&category=3.
86. Id.
87. NYSE, Market Activity, NYSE Group Turnover (2007), http://www.nyxdata.com/
nysedata/asp/factbook/vieweredition.asp?mode table&key=3092&category=5.
88. Calculated.
89. NYSE, Margin Debt and Stock Loan, Securities Market Credit (2007),
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=3089
&category=8.
90. NYSE, Market Activity, NYSE Monthly Program Trading (2007),
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=3085
&category=3. For the last week of the third quarter in 2007, program trading on the NYSE
accounted for 42% of all program trading. Program trading is defined as the purchase or
sale of fifteen or more stocks with a total value of $1 million or more.
91. Press Release, NYSE Group Inc. Issues Short Interest Report New York (Jan.
7, 2008), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1199706380156.html.
92. NYSE, Market Activity, Specialist Activity (2007), http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/
asp/factbook/viewer edition.asp?mode=table&key=3083&category=3.
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TABLE 3: SELECTED DATA FOR EQUITY OPTIONS
93
2006 Total Volume / CBOE Volume (contracts)
2007 Total Volume (estimate)(shares)
2007 NYSE Volume (shares)
CBOE Open Interest (12/2006) (contracts)
2006 CBOE Market Share (by volume)
2006 Open Interest (estimate)(shares)
2007 Open Interest (estimate)(shares)
1,494,491,357 I 390,657,577
1.494B x 1.25 x 100 187B shares
532B shares
187,953,281 contracts
26% by volume
(188M / .26) x 100 = 72,308B
72,308B x 1.25 = 90,385B
93. See CHICAGO BOARD OPTIONS EXCHANGE 2006 MARKET STATISTICS, at 4-5 (2006),
available at http://www.cboe.com/data/marketstats-2006.pdf.
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TABLE 4: SELECTED DATA FOR SINGLE STOCK FUTURES
94
Open Interest (12/2007)
Annual Volume (12/2007)
343,291 contracts (100 shares each)
7,835,289 contracts (100 shares each)
94. OneChicago, Month End Volume and Open Interest Summary For 12/2007,
available at www.onechicago.com/wp-content/uploads/pr/dec07volumereport.pdf.
MONTH END VOLUME AND OPEN INTEREST - SUMMARY
FOR 12/2007
Type 12/2007 12/2007 Previous % YTD Month
Average Total Year Change Total End
Daily Volume Monthly Volume Open
Volume Volume Interest
ETF 895 17,901 590 2934% 51,034 389
NBI 2674 53,480 41,600 29% 219,640 26,740
SSF 15,485 309,695 1,064,499 -71% 7,835,289 343,291
Exchange 19,054 381,076 1,106,689 -66% 8,105,963 370,420
Total I
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TABLE 5: NYSE SHARE VOLUME / CAPITALIZATION/ TURNOVER
9 5
Average Daily Global Market Companies Listed Percent
Volume (millions of Capitalization (trillions Turnover
shares) of dollars)
96
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
1,602
1,457
1,398
1,441
1,240
1,042
809
674
527
412
346
291
265
202
179
157
165
161
189
141
109
91
85
65
47
45
32
29
21
21
19
14
16
16
15
12
11
13
10
8
6
5
5
4
4
3
$21.20
$19.80
$17.30
$13.40
$16.00
$17.10
$16.80
$14.00
$11.80
$9.20
2,767
2,768
2,750
2,783
2,798
2,862
3,025
3,114
3,047
2,907
2,675
2,570
2,361
2,089
1,885
1,774
1,720
1,681
1,647
1,575
1,541
1,543
1,550
1,526
1,565
1,570
1,565
1,581
1,575
1,576
1,557
1,567
1,560
1,505
1,426
1,351
1,311
1,273
1,274
1,286
1,273
1,247
1,214
1,186
1,163
1.143
103%
99%
99%
105%
94%
88%
78%
76%
69%
63%
59%
54%
54%
48%
48%
46%
52%
55%
73%
64%
54%
49%
51%
42%
33%
36%
28%
27%
21%
23%
21%
16%
20%
23%
23%
19%
20%
24%
22%
18%
16%
14%
15%
13%
15%
12%
95. NYSE, NYSE Historical Statistics, NYSE Overview Statistics,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer-edition.asp?mode=table&key=268
&category=14 (last visited June 1, 2008).
96. Market capitalization is as of year end and includes US companies plus global
market capitalization of NYSE listed non US companies and closed-end funds. Turnover is
based on volume not dollar value.
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TABLE 6: S&P CAPITALIZATION WEIGHTED TURNOVER
Capitalization weighted turnover is calculated by adding the market value
of company additions, company deletions, share issuances, share
repurchases, quarterly share and investable weight factor changes in the
index during the year, divided by 2 and then divided by the average market
value of the index over the year.97
S&P MidCap SmallCap S&P S&P S&P
500 400 600 900 1000 1500
2007 5.21% 19.89% 18.97% 6.41% 19.58% 6.90%
2006 4.54% 12.18% 12.94% 5.68% 12.43% 5.51%
2005 5.73% 14.49% 13.83% 5.93% 13.47% 6.08%
2004 3.10% 13.11% 12.95% 3.63% 9.79% 3.13%
2003 1.45% 8.60% 10.98% 1.62% 6.30% 1.79%
2002 3.82% 10.72% 10.99% 3.74% 8.12% 3.69%
2001 4.43% 16.98% 15.63% 4.51% 14.79% 4.25%
2000 8.91% 37.14% 36.41% 8.15% 31.66% 7.67%
1999 6.16% 28.87% 24.39% 6.00% 24.41% 5.47%
1998 9.46% 31.38% 24.38% 8.68% 25.58% 8.81%
1997 4.92% 17.91% 21.84% 5.29% 16.15% 5.36%
1996 4.58% 14.36% 16.37% 4.21% 13.68% 5.34%
1995 5.00% 15.57% 13.73% 5.10% 13.58% 5.97%
1994 3.78% 9.89% N/A 3.64% N/A N/A
1993 2.64% 10.32% N/A 2.35% N/A N/A
1992 1.18% 5.84% N/A 1.27% N/A N/A
97. Standard & Poor's, Indices, http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/
page.topic/indices_500/2,3,2,2,0,0,0,0,0,5,13,0,0,0,0,0.html (last visited June 1, 2008).
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TABLE 7: TURNOVER IN VANGUARD INDEX FUNDS
98
Portfolio Index 2007
Domestic Stock - General Ticker Stocks Stocks Turnover
500 Index Fund VFINX 508 500 5.50
Dividend Appreciation Index VDAIX 219 214 17.50
FTSE Social Index VFTSX 396 395 19.80
Growth Index Fund VIGRX 422 420 24.70
High Dividend Yield Index Fund VHDYX 580 580 9.50
Large-Cap Index Fund VLACX 741 740 8.90
Total Stock Market Index Fund VTSMX 3565 3810 4.50
Value Index Fund VIVAX 394 394 22.00
Average 14.05
Domestic Stock -- More Aggressive
Extended Market Index Fund VEXMX 3204 4319 15.10
Mid-Cap Growth Index Fund VMGIX 229 229 61.20
Mid-Cap Index Fund VIMSX 441 439 20.50
Mid-Cap Value Index Fund VMVIX 260 260 37.40
Small-Cap Growth Index Fund VISGX 934 926 33.70
Small-Cap Index Fund NAESX 1728 1714 17.80
Small-Cap Value Index Fund VISVX 982 975 36.50
Average 31.74
98. Data collected at Vanguard, Vanguard Funds by Name Prices and Performance,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/FundsByName (last visited May 15, 2008).
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